Exchange Rate Volatility and the Credit Channel in Emerging Markets: A Vertical Perspective by Caballero, Ricardo & Krishnamurthy, Arvind
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Exchange Rate Volatility and the Credit
Channel in Emerging Markets: A
Vertical Perspective
Ricardo Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy
25. January 2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/824/
MPRA Paper No. 824, posted 14. November 2006
Exchange Rate Volatility and the Credit
Channel in Emerging Markets: A Vertical
Perspective∗
Ricardo Caballeroa and Arvind Krishnamurthyb
aMassachusetts Institute of Technology
bNorthwestern University
Firms in emerging markets are exposed to severe ﬁnan-
cial frictions and credit constraints that are exacerbated by
the sudden stop of capital inﬂows. Can monetary policy oﬀset
this external credit squeeze? We show that although this may
be the case during moderate contractions (or in partial equi-
librium), the expansionary eﬀect of monetary policy vanishes
during severe external crises. The exchange rate jumps to re-
duce the dollar value of domestic collateral until equilibrium
in domestic ﬁnancial markets is consistent with the external
constraint. An expansionary monetary policy in this context
raises the value of domestic collateral, but it exacerbates the
exchange rate depreciation (beyond the standard interest par-
ity eﬀect) and has little eﬀect on aggregate activity. However,
there is a dynamic linkage between monetary policy and sud-
den stops. The anticipation of a dogged defense of the exchange
rate worsens the consequences of sudden stops by distorting
the private sector incentive to take precautions against these
shocks. For similar general equilibrium reasons, dollarization
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of liabilities has limited impact during a sudden stop, but it
has signiﬁcant underinsurance consequences.
JEL Codes: E0, E4, E5, F0, F3, F4, G1
Emerging markets can suﬀer severe contractions when capital in-
ﬂows suddenly reverse (“sudden stops”). What is the right monetary
policy response to this event? Answering this important question re-
quires understanding the mechanisms through which monetary pol-
icy can aﬀect sudden stops and their consequences. The main contri-
bution of this paper is to rethink the workings of the credit channel
in emerging market economies and to propose an alternative view
that shifts the focus from credit channel and aggregate demand to
insurance considerations.
Much of the recent literature on emerging markets crises high-
lights the limited ﬁnancial development of these economies and the
severe credit squeeze experienced by local ﬁrms during crises. From
this structure, two opposing arguments are commonly made regard-
ing optimal monetary policy. Extrapolating from developed economy
credit channel analysis, some advocate an expansionary monetary
policy to oﬀset the eﬀect of the credit squeeze during downturns.
Others advocate a contractionary monetary policy and dogged de-
fense of the exchange rate during crises. Proponents of the latter
view do not disagree on the centrality of the credit channel mecha-
nism, but argue that a depreciating exchange rate will have dramatic
eﬀects in the credit channel mechanism, through a deterioration in
borrowers’ balance sheets. The argument is that this eﬀect is most
likely to happen when the economy is dollarized and when inﬂation
credibility is limited.1
The starting point of our analysis is the observation from
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) that credit constraints in
emerging markets may exist both at the country level as well as
the ﬁrm level. A ﬁrm may have limited collateral and therefore be
constrained in borrowing from either domestic or foreign lenders. Or
the country as a whole may have limited international collateral, and
therefore domestic ﬁrms are constrained in borrowing from foreign
1For both sides of the argument see, e.g., Furman and Stiglitz (1998); Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000); Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000); Gertler,
Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2001); Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004); and Calvo
and Reinhart (2003).
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investors.2 Extrapolation from developed economy analysis misses
this distinction because in developed economies the credit constraint
plausibly exists only at the ﬁrm level. The distinction is important
for thinking through the eﬀects of monetary policy because a sud-
den stop created by the reversal of capital inﬂows is predominantly
about a binding international collateral constraint.
We argue that during mild crises, the distinction between do-
mestic and international constraints is immaterial. Analysis of this
case can be conducted in the standard credit channel framework.
Much of the recent debate on monetary policy during crises implic-
itly assumes this to be the relevant scenario. As is stressed in the
credit channel literature (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999;
Kiyotaki and Moore 1997), increasing the net worth of borrowers is
the optimal response to a negative shock. Our analysis of this case
reinforces the conclusions in the literature: there is some ambiguity
regarding whether the optimal monetary policy is to raise or lower
interest rates. It depends on the extent of liability dollarization and
inﬂation credibility of the central bank.
The recipe of using monetary policy to increase the net worth
of borrowers fails when the credit constraint exists at the country
level. The reason is that monetary policy only regulates the bor-
rowing of a domestic agent from a domestic lender. Thus, when the
marginal lender is a foreign investor, monetary policy is ineﬀective
because it does not alter the international collateral of the coun-
try.3 We argue that this is the relevant case for emerging markets’
crises.
Although monetary expansions have little eﬀect on output dur-
ing a severe crisis, they have important general equilibrium eﬀects on
asset prices. In partial equilibrium, it is still true that a monetary ex-
pansion raises ﬁrms’ borrowing capacity by increasing their domestic
liquidity. But in general equilibrium, the expansion just translates
2The importance of international collateral constraints for emerging markets
was ﬁrst identiﬁed in the sovereign debt literature (see, e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz
1981 or Bulow and Rogoﬀ 1989).
3Though in very diﬀerent terms, Dornbusch (2001) also expresses his uneasi-
ness about the assumption that emerging economies with access to monetary
policy can use it to boost activity. For example, in criticizing the standard view,
he writes: “The loss of the lender of last resort [argument] is intriguing. This
argument is based on the assumption that the central bank—rather than the
treasury or the world capital market—is the appropriate lender...”
210 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
into a decline in the relative price of domestic liquidity vis-a`-vis
international liquidity, not in an expansion in international liquidity
(i.e., it does not loosen the international constraint). We show that
the fall in the price of domestic liquidity implies a temporary ex-
change rate depreciation during the crisis. In fact, the depreciation
of the exchange rate is beyond the depreciation due to the standard
interest parity mechanism. The depreciation does weaken balance
sheets, as some have argued in the context of the credit channel.
But it is not ﬁrm-level balance sheets that are to blame. The ex-
change rate depreciation is just the general equilibrium counterpart
of the tight international constraint.
Our conclusions regarding the eﬀects of monetary policy are in-
dependent of the dollarization of balance sheets. Monetary policy
is impotent during crises whether or not dollarized balance sheets
undo the beneﬁcial eﬀects of lowering interest rates. The reason,
again, is that domestic dollarization just tightens constraints at the
ﬁrm level; it does not alter the aggregate international collateral of
the country.4
The second main theme of the paper concerns the insurance ef-
fects of monetary policy. Despite the apparent impotence of mone-
tary policy during sudden stops, expectations regarding a particular
monetary rule have important eﬀects on the private sector’s ex-ante
decisions. The anticipation of monetary policy actions during crises
aﬀects agents’ expectations of the relative price of domestic to inter-
national liquidity, which in turn aﬀects the private sector’s insurance
decisions against sudden stops. If the private sector expects a dogged
defense of the exchange rate, then it also expects a smaller decline
of the value of domestic to international liquidity. Conversely, if it
expects an expansionary monetary policy, then it expects a sharper
decline in the relative price of domestic liquidity. The incentive to
hoard international over domestic liquidity is more pronounced in
the latter than in the former case. Importantly, hoarding more in-
ternational liquidity is desirable when there are negative pecuniary
externalities in the use of international liquidity, a feature that is
4Dollarization of external liabilities has some additional external insurance
implications that we discuss later in this paper and, more thoroughly, in Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2003). This is not an issue for the analysis of this paper since
we allow for state-contingent debt.
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inherent to economies with underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets (see
Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001).
From this perspective, our argument connects with the litera-
ture on the virtues of ﬂexible versus ﬁxed exchange rate systems.5 In
our model, a ﬂexible exchange rate system coupled with a counter-
cyclical monetary policy provides better insurance incentives to the
private sector than a policy of defending the exchange rate during
sudden stops.6 More generally, monetary policy and its constraints
have (unintended) consequences for the private sector’s insurance
decisions with respect to sudden stops. Policies that exacerbate the
(partial equilibrium) domestic credit squeeze during sudden stops,
or constraints that limit the central bank’s ability to relax domes-
tic ﬁnancial constraints, lead to ex-ante imprudent private sector
actions.
In section 1 we present a model of market segmentation in which
we draw a distinction between domestic and international liquidity.
Section 2 describes the consequences of monetary policy in the seg-
mented ﬁnancial market. In particular, we show the oversensitivity
of the exchange rate to monetary policy and the role of the exchange
rate in endogenously aligning the extent of domestic credit squeeze
with the limited international liquidity. In Section 3 we turn to
the ex-ante consequences of monetary policy and its private insur-
ance implications. We show that the strategy of tightening monetary
policy during crises lowers the private return to taking preventive
measures.
In section 4 we revisit the dollarization of liabilities argument,
but now in the context of our dual-liquidity model. We show that
the balance-sheet eﬀect typically emphasized in this literature has
no aggregate consequences in general equilibrium during the crisis.
However, and following our argument above, there is a dynamic
cost. Dollarization lowers the expected return on hoarding inter-
national liquidity and hence reduces the private sector incentives
to take adequate precautions against sudden stops. In section 5 we
highlight that not having the credibility or willingness to conduct a
5See, e.g., Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) for evidence supporting the ad-
vantages of a ﬂexible exchange rate in absorbing external shocks.
6Our mechanism is distinct (or in addition to) the standard free insurance
argument in the moral hazard perspective of crises (see, e.g., Dooley 1999). We
return to this comparison after developing our model.
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countercyclical monetary policy means that an insurance mechanism
against crises is lost. Thus, one should look for alternative measures
that induce the private sector to carry more international liquidity
into crisis states. Examples of these measures include taxation of
capital inﬂows, international liquidity requirements, and large ster-
ilizations of capital inﬂows. While enacting these measures may be
costly, they should be seen as yet another cost of having lost the abil-
ity to use monetary policy in an environment of recurrent external
crises.
Section 6 shows that our main conclusions are robust to the relax-
ation of some of the main stylized assumptions of our model, such
as the presence of a “diagonal” supply of funds or an alternative
model of money. Section 7 concludes and is followed by a technical
appendix.
1. A Model of External Crises
We study a three-date economy (t = 0, 1, 2) with a single (tradeable)
good. Date 0 is a fully ﬂexible planning period. Agents make invest-
ment and ﬁnancing decisions at this date. At date 1 an external crisis
may occur. We assume that there are two states of the world at date
1, ω ∈ {b, g}, which occur with probabilities {π, 1 − π}. The crisis
can occur only if the b-state realizes. At date 2 agents repay all debts
and consume.
1.1 Private Sector
There is a unit measure of domestic ﬁrms. Each has access to a
production technology. Building a plant of size k at date 0 requires a
ﬁrm to invest c(k)—with c(.) ≥ 0, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. The output from
production depends on the shocks at date 1. There is a maximum
of Ak output goods at date 2, but if negative shocks hit ﬁrms, then
only ak (a < A) output goods may be produced. A more detailed
description is given below.
Domestic ﬁrms have no resources at date 0. They must import
capital goods and borrow from foreigners to ﬁnance their investment.
Each ﬁrm is run by a domestic entrepreneur/manager who has risk-
neutral preferences over date 2 consumption of the single good. Thus,
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ﬁnancing and investment decisions are taken to maximize expected
plant proﬁts at date 2.
Domestic ﬁrms face signiﬁcant ﬁnancial constraints, and hence
their ﬁnancial net worth aﬀects investment decisions. We assume
that ﬁrms are endowed with w units of international collateral,
in the form of receivables arriving at date 2. Our central assump-
tion is that only these receivables have collateral value to foreigners
(e.g., prime exports).
We disregard explicit equilibrium default and assume that all
ﬁnancing is done via fully collateralized debt contracts. Moreover,
we assume that the debt contracts are made fully contingent on the
state at date 1. We relax this in section 4 when discussing dollarized
external debt, since the problem of dollar debt is essentially one of
liabilities that are too inﬂexible.
At date 0, when ﬁrms sign debt contracts with foreigners, the
contracted repayments of fω must not exceed w. Foreigners lend
against this collateral at dates 0 and 1 at the rate i∗0 and i∗1 from
period 0 to 1, and 1 to 2, respectively.
We also assume that domestic agents have some “domestic” as-
sets that they can only trade to other domestic agents. First, we
assume that the minimum date 2 output of ak can be pledged as
collateral to other domestic agents. Second, we assume that agents
are endowed with M units of domestic money (see below) that they
can sell to other agents.
This modeling captures the distinction between domestic bor-
rowing capacity and international borrowing capacity. We think of
the domestic assets as “peso” assets, while the international collat-
eral are “dollar” assets. Thus, changes in the exchange rate have
an eﬀect on the dollar value of domestic assets but not that of the
international assets.
1.2 Credit Constraints During Crises
A crisis is a time when there is a shortage of resources available
to ﬁnance investments. Formally, we model the external crisis by
assuming that the demand for external resources rises in the b-state,
while holding the international collateral ﬁxed. An alternative (and
more realistic) modeling of a shortage of external resources would
be to assume that international collateral contracts during the crisis,
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while demand for external resources remains ﬁxed. The implications
of these two modeling strategies are similar for our purposes, but our
approach reduces the number of assumptions and equations required.
In particular, we do not need to add an assumption of incomplete
international insurance markets.7
In the g-state there are no shocks and investment is unaﬀected.
Let us now turn to deﬁning the shock in the b-state and explaining
how it aﬀects investments.
The plants of one-half of the ﬁrms receive a shock at date 1 that
lowers output per plant from A to a. The shock only arrives in the
b-state, but is idiosyncratic in that each ﬁrm receives the shock with
probability 1/2. The productivity decline can be oﬀset by reinvesting
θk (θ ≤ 1) goods, to give date 2 output of
A˜(θ)k = (a + θ∆)k ≤ Ak where ∆ ≡ A− a,
so that A˜(1) = A. We assume that the return on reinvestment ex-
ceeds the international interest rate:
∆− 1 > i∗1.
This means that ﬁrms will borrow as much as possible to ﬁnance
reinvestment. A crisis occurs if ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained at
date 1, so that θ < 1. We make parametric assumptions to ensure
that this occurs in equilibrium only in the b-state (see the appendix).
A ﬁrm that receives a production shock is termed distressed. To
cope with the shock, the ﬁrm ﬁrst borrows directly from foreigners
against its net international collateral of w − f . After this, it must
turn for funds to the domestic ﬁrms that did not receive a shock
(termed intact). As noted above, domestic agents accept the money
held by distressed ﬁrms as payment. They also accept ak of the
output from a ﬁrm’s plants as collateral for any domestic debt. Thus
the domestic (real) liquidity of ﬁrms entering date 1 (i.e., the date 2
goods that can be pledged to domestic agents) is
ak + M/e2 (1)
7See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) for the alternative approach. See
Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2003) for evidence that some of these interna-
tional collateral shocks are due to shocks to specialist investors (in our framework,
this is as if suddenly foreign lenders decide to reduce the share of w that is part
of international collateral).
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where e2 is the date 2 nominal exchange rate (also the price level).
Intact ﬁrms have no output at date 1 either, so they must borrow
from foreigners if they are to ﬁnance the distressed ﬁrms. At the
interest rate of i∗1, they can borrow up to
w−f
1+i∗1
from foreigners.
Since at date 1 ﬁrms, in aggregate, can borrow from foreigners
up to
wn ≡ w − f
1 + i∗1
, (2)
we refer to wn as the international liquidity of the country during
the crisis.
1.3 Central Bank
The central bank has M units of money outstanding at date 0. At
date 1, it may choose to inject (M −M) more money into ﬁrms. We
assume that this money is distributed as “helicopter” drops to ﬁrms
and redeemed at date 2 with taxes collected by the government.
We do not provide a detailed description of the government’s tax
powers and its tax base. Instead we assume that the government
collects T goods via nondistortionary taxation, and that these taxes
do not come from ﬁrms. We think of these taxes as resources from
a consumer sector that has a date 2 endowment of yc ≥ T . When it
is eﬀective, expansionary monetary policy transfers resources from
consumers to the corporate sector.8
We assume that the central bank is credible in maintaining the
date 2 price level at one, so that money injections do not lead to
inﬂation. We relax this assumption in section 5 when we discuss
inﬂation credibility. Thus, for now, the date 2 exchange rate is e2 = 1.
Our model of the monetary transmission mechanism involves no
monetary frictions, because our qualitative conclusions do not de-
pend on the presence of these frictions and ignoring them simpliﬁes
the exposition. The domestic “peso” interest rate is zero in our envi-
ronment and is unaﬀected by monetary policy. Therefore the usual
channel (through the interest parity condition) by which monetary
policy aﬀects the exchange rate is absent in our model. Despite this,
we show that in our model, monetary policy still aﬀects the exchange
8See, e.g., Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) for a similar
assumption.
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rate. For this reason, we refer to the exchange rate movements
induced by monetary policy as “overresponsive.” Our results should
be interpreted as in addition to those that arise from the movement
in the peso rate and its eﬀect through the interest parity condition. In
section 6, we sketch a more standard model in which money provides
a transaction service, thus conﬁrming that our results are robust to
this simpliﬁcation.9
2. Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Determination,
and the Credit Channel
In this section we examine the equilibrium in the crisis state at date
1. Thus, for now, we take the date 0 investment decision of k and the
ﬁnancing decision of f as given. We study the case where credit con-
straints are binding in this crisis state, illustrating that the power of
monetary policy to relax these constraints changes from mild (hori-
zontal) to severe (vertical) crises.
All of the discussion in this section takes place after the bad
state has realized at date 1 and the central bank has injected (M −
M) pesos in response. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of shocks and
agents’ decisions.
2.1 Mild and Severe Crises (Date 1)
At date 1, distressed ﬁrms need to borrow in order to ﬁnance their
production shock. Their total net worth, measured in dollars, is
ak+M
e1
+ wn. Clearly, as M rises, so does net worth, at least for a
given e1. The key question is whether e1 depreciates with an expan-
sionary monetary policy and by how much. We argue that the answer
to this question depends critically on the severity of the crisis. If the
latter is severe, a monetary expansion is ineﬀective in raising output
and leads to an exchange rate overreaction. This happens despite full
inﬂation target credibility (e2 = 1), as it reﬂects the fall in the real
value of domestic collateral (i.e., not a monetary phenomenon).
9The discussion in section 6 also clariﬁes exchange rate determination in our
setup. When the peso interest rate is zero, e1, which we refer to as the date 1
exchange rate, can also be interpreted as the forward exchange rate standing at
date 1 for exchange at date 2. In section 6 we show that when the peso interest
rate is nonzero, this ambiguity disappears and e1 is the date 1 exchange rate.
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Figure 1. Timeline
Note: The ﬁgure presents the timing of investment, borrowing, and con-
sumption decisions. Also pictured are the shocks aﬀecting ﬁrms at date 1.
Let us consider equilibrium at date 1. Distressed ﬁrms can borrow
wn directly from foreign investors. Thereafter they must turn to
other domestic agents to raise resources. Recall that intact ﬁrms
can also borrow wn from foreign investors. Moreover, since they are
willing to accept domestic money as payment as well as purchase
debt claims backed by ak of collateral, they can also ﬁnance the
production shock of the distressed ﬁrms.
There are two regions of interest. If
1
2
wn >
1
2
ak + M
1 + i∗1
, (3)
then intact ﬁrms have suﬃcient access to foreign funds to satisfy de-
mand from all distressed ﬁrms. We refer to this case as the horizontal
region, because the supply of funds from intact ﬁrms is elastic at the
margin.
The other case is when
1
2
wn <
1
2
ak + M
1 + i∗1
,
while wn < k/2. That is, intact ﬁrms have insuﬃcient resources
to satisfy demand from distressed ﬁrms. We refer to this case as the
vertical region, because the supply of funds is inelastic at the margin.
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2.2 Horizontal Region (Mild Crises): The Standard
Credit Channel
Intact ﬁrms have portfolios that include domestic loans, money, and
international collateral. Indiﬀerence requires that i∗1 be the interest
rate on the domestic loans as well. The exchange rate can also be de-
termined from this indiﬀerence condition. Since the return on holding
money must be equal to 1 + i∗1, the exchange rate is
e1 = 1 + i∗1. (4)
This equation is the interest parity condition, given that e2 = 1
and that money provides no special transaction service (so the peso
interest rate is zero). Note that the exchange rate is unresponsive to
monetary injections.
Total reinvestment is determined by the total resources of indi-
vidual distressed ﬁrms,
θHk = wn +
ak + M
e1
=
w − f + ak + M
1 + i∗1
< 2wn, θH < 1, (5)
where the superscript H denotes the horizontal equilibrium. The
ﬁrst inequality shows that the economy has not used all of its inter-
national liquidity, while θH < 1 indicates that the economy is in a
crisis: distressed ﬁrms are not able to meet their production shock
fully because of their binding ﬁnancial constraints.
As we mentioned above, we refer to this as the horizontal region,
because the price of loans is not aﬀected by their quantity. In princi-
ple, a distressed ﬁrm could continue borrowing at the given interest
rate i∗1, as long as its own ﬁnancial constraint is relaxed.
We can see the eﬀects of monetary injections from the preceding
expressions. They operate though a credit channel a` la Bernanke
and Gertler (1995). From (5) we note that injecting money increases
the resources of the distressed ﬁrms and increases their investment.
From (4) we note that this policy has no eﬀect on exchange rates
in the horizontal region, so the monetary expansion is a powerful
mechanism to raise the dollar value of distressed ﬁrms’ collateral.
It is possible that reintroducing the standard interest parity eﬀect
(which we have suppressed) will work against this conclusion. But
as we show next, in the vertical region, we reach the unambiguous
conclusion that the exchange rate eﬀect will neutralize monetary
expansions.
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2.3 The Vertical Region (Severe Crises): Overresponsive
Exchange Rate
In this region, the international supply of funds faced by emerg-
ing market economies during external crises is vertical (i.e., price
inelastic). Since all investment at date 1 is eventually ﬁnanced by
foreigners, the stock of international liquidity is what determines
investment in this region:
θV k = 2wn (6)
where the superscript V stands for vertical equilibrium. Note that
domestic collateral does not appear at all in this expression.
Consider the exchange rate next. Since intact ﬁrms borrow up
to their maximum capacity from foreigners and hold portfolios only
composed of domestic money and loans against domestic collateral,
it must be that the return on holding domestic money exceeds i∗1.
That is,
e1 > 1 + i∗1,
and the date 1 exchange rate is depreciated.
Indiﬀerence between holding money and domestic loans implies
that the (dollar) interest rate on loans against domestic collateral
also rises above i∗1. In equilibrium, loans collateralized by w are made
at rate i∗1, while those collateralized by ak are made at a higher rate
of id1, where
id1 = e1 − 1 > i∗1.
Figure 2 represents the equilibrium determination of e1. The ver-
tical axis is the price, e1, while the horizontal axis measures domestic
reinvestment. For e1 = 1+ i∗1, intact ﬁrms elastically supply their in-
ternational liquidity to distressed ﬁrms. However, at the point wn,
intact ﬁrms run out of international liquidity, and the supply curve
turns vertical. On the other side of the domestic ﬁnancial market,
distressed ﬁrms demand as much international liquidity as they can
obtain as long as the exchange rate is less than or equal to ∆. How-
ever, they are constrained in their domestic borrowing by their hold-
ings of money and domestic collateral. The demand for international
liquidity turns downward at some point, and eﬀective demand is
M+ak
e1
. Figure 2 represents two cases: one equilibrium in the horizon-
tal region (panel A) and one in the vertical case (panel B).
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Figure 2. Equilibrium Exchange Rate
Note: The ﬁgure illustrates the equilibrium determination of e1 in both the
horizontal and vertical regions of the supply of international liquidity.
This ﬁgure illustrates how e1 rises above 1 + i∗1 in the vertical
region when international liquidity is scarce. Note also that e1 can
never exceed ∆, the marginal product of reinvestment for distressed
ﬁrms. However, there is a large interval for demand within which e1
lies strictly between 1 + i∗1 and ∆. In this case,
e1 =
M + ak
wn
> 1 + i∗1. (7)
We can see that monetary injections have a very diﬀerent ef-
fect in the vertical than in the horizontal region. From (6), we note
that injecting money has no eﬀect on date 1 reinvestment. This is
because the economy has a shortage of international liquidity, and
reallocating domestic liquidity has no real (aggregate) eﬀect.
As before, the net worth of distressed ﬁrms is
wn +
ak + M
e1
.
That is, the credit channel is still active, and the net worth of dis-
tressed ﬁrms is what determines reinvestment at date 1. But the
exchange rate now is overresponsive to monetary injections. Refer-
ring back to equation (7), we see that monetary injections are oﬀset
one-for-one by a depreciation in the exchange rate. Essentially, the
Vol. 1 No. 1 Exchange Rate Volatility 221
Figure 3. Domestic Liquidity Expansion
Note: The ﬁgure illustrates the eﬀect of an expansion in domestic liquidity
on the exchange rate, e1, as well as the quantity of loans. The ﬁgure presents
these eﬀects in both the horizontal and vertical regions of the supply of
international liquidity.
exchange rate depreciates to ensure that the dollar net worth re-
mains at a level consistent with the availability of external funds.
This role of the exchange rate, captured in (7), is what is behind the
monetary ineﬀectiveness result.
2.4 Discussion: The Credit Channel in Emerging Markets
Panels A and B in ﬁgure 3 summarize the diﬀerences between the
horizontal and vertical views. In their downward sloping segments,
demands are equal to (ak + M)/e1.
In the horizontal case, the increase in domestic net worth of dis-
tressed ﬁrms caused by expanding monetary policy raises date 1
investment, leaving e1 unaﬀected. In the vertical region, the same
increase has no eﬀect on equilibrium investment and only raises e1.
We view the horizontal region as relevant for developed
economies; w is plentiful, and there is no distinction between do-
mestic and international liquidity. It may also apply for emerging
economies experiencing moderate contractions. The vertical region,
on the other hand, seems to be a better description of the environ-
ment faced by emerging markets during severe external crises.
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There are two points to emphasize from this analysis. First, it
may be that other mechanisms overturn the result that injecting
money is expansionary in the horizontal region (for example, debts
may be dollarized, as we discuss shortly). But in the vertical region,
we reach the unambiguous conclusion that injecting money is fully
oﬀset by the depreciation in the exchange rate.
This leads to a second point. A researcher looking at the net
worth of credit-constrained ﬁrms during a crisis will always conclude
that the reason for monetary policy ineﬀectiveness is the deteriora-
tion in net worth triggered by the exchange rate depreciation—in
particular, the dollarization of liabilities (more on this below). But
this is not the right conclusion in the vertical region. The main credit
constraint behind the crisis is an aggregate constraint, not a microec-
onomic one; the exchange rate depreciation is simply the equilibrium
response to such restriction.
3. Underinsurance and Monetary Policy
Of course, all our claims so far are from the perspective of date 1
in the b-state, when wn is already given. But what is the impact
of anticipated monetary policy in the event of a crisis on date 0
decisions? We turn to this discussion next.
We show that a central bank that is expected to contract money
in the event of a vertical crisis at date 1 actually causes the private
sector to alter date 0 decisions so as to arrive at date 1 with a
smaller wn. By supporting the date 1 currency, the central bank
causes the private sector to overborrow at date 0 and underinsure
against the crisis. Conversely, expansionary monetary policy gives
the private sector incentives to insure against the crisis and reduce
date 0 borrowing.
3.1 Private Sector Date 0 Decisions and eb1
At date 0, the private sector decides how much to borrow from for-
eign investors and how much real investment to undertake. The bor-
rowing contracts specify an amount loaned to a domestic ﬁrm and a
repayment at date 2, fω, contingent on the date 1 (aggregate) state
ω ∈ {b, g}. Since the funds raised from this loan are used in date 0
investment, and since foreign investors are risk neutral, the date 0
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budget constraint is
c(k) ≤ 1
(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
(
(1− π)fg + πf b
)
. (8)
In the g-state at date 1, all ﬁrms make proﬁts of
Ak + (w − fg) + M.
In the b-state, one-half of the ﬁrms are distressed and they make
proﬁts of (
ak + M
eb1
+
w − f b
1 + i∗1
)
∆,
while the other half are intact and make proﬁts of
Ak + (w − f b) e
b
1
1 + i∗1
+ M.
Combining these expressions leads to the following problem for
a ﬁrm at date 0:
PRIV:
maxk,fg ,fb (1− π)(Ak + w − fg + M)
+π 12
((
A + a∆
eb1
)
k + (∆+ eb1)
w−fb
1+i∗1
+
(
1 + ∆
eb1
)
M
)
s.t. fg, f b ≤ w
c(k) ≤ 1(1+i∗0)(1+i∗1)(πf
b + (1− π)fg).
Our technical assumptions (see the appendix) guarantee that
fg = w and f b < w. The former holds as long as increasing in-
vestment in k at date 0 is more proﬁtable than investment in inter-
national markets. And f b < w as long as saving some resources to
absorb the production shocks at date 1 is more valuable than using
all of those resources toward investment at date 0. It is apparent
from the private program that eb1 is the only equilibrium price that
inﬂuences the date 0 decision. Let us study this connection more
closely.
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Since fg = w, we simply need to consider the trade-oﬀ between
increasing f b and reducing k. At date 0, building a marginally larger
plant increases (expected) date 2 proﬁts by
(1− π)A + π1
2
(
A + a
∆
eb1
)
. (9)
Building this larger plant requires the ﬁrm to raise an additional
c′(k) at date 0. The probability of a crisis is π, so in order to raise
an additional c′(k) at date 0, f b must rise by
c′(k)(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
π
.
The cost to the ﬁrm of raising f b is that there are fewer resources to
absorb the date 1 production shock. The fall in expected proﬁts due
to having fewer resources is
π
(
∆+ eb1
2(1 + i∗1)
)
c′(k)(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
π
,
which can be simpliﬁed to
c′(k)(1 + i∗0)
(
∆+ eb1
2
)
. (10)
The optimal choice of k by the private sector equalizes (9) and (10).
We note two comparative statics and the conclusion that follows from
them: (1) The beneﬁt of building a larger plant size is decreasing in
eb1; (2) The marginal cost of investing is increasing in e
b
1. For both
reasons, k is decreasing with respect to eb1.
10
The investment/ﬁnancing decision at date 0 is really to create a
(real) “peso” plant at the cost of having fewer “dollar” assets in the
b-state. The reason for this is that the output from k can only be
used as domestic collateral and hence is aﬀected by the value of the
exchange rate. On the other hand, to build the plant, the ﬁrm has
10It is not eb1, per se, that matters in this trade-oﬀ, but
eb1
e2
(i.e., the expected
future depreciation of the exchange rate) times one plus the ip1 (the peso rate).
Since we have set e2 = 1 and i
p
1 = 0, this point is obscured. We relax these
assumptions later in the paper.
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to raise f b, meaning that there is less international liquidity in the
b-state.
Intuitively, the reason why eb1 matters is that it changes the terms
of this investment/ﬁnancing decision. A more depreciated eb1 gives
ﬁrms less incentive to increase k and more incentive to decrease f .
This is the reason that k is decreasing with respect to eb1.
3.2 Consumption Maximizing eb1
We now ask what level of the exchange rate, eb1, is required in or-
der for the date 0 decisions to maximize (expected) aggregate con-
sumption. We show that for eb1 < ∆, the private sector generally
overborrows and overinvests relative to this benchmark.
Consider ﬁrst the date 0 decisions of the private sector, (k, fg, f b),
that maximize aggregate consumption. To arrive at this program,
we simply substitute out the exchange rate of eb1 from PRIV. If we
substitute the market clearing condition for eb1 from (7) into PRIV
we ﬁnd that
AGG:
maxk,fg ,fb (1− π)(Ak + w − fg) + π
(
w−fb
1+i∗1
∆+ A+a2 k
)
s.t. fg, f b ≤ w
c(k) ≤ 1(1+i∗0)(1+i∗1)(πf
b + (1− π)fg).
The trade-oﬀ between increasing k versus f b is very diﬀerent here
than in PRIV. The beneﬁt of increasing plant size is
(1− π)A + π1
2
(A + a) .
For eb1 < ∆, this beneﬁt is strictly lower than the private sector’s
computation. On the cost side, borrowing more to build this plant
costs
c′(k)(1 + i∗0)∆.
For eb1 < ∆, the cost lies strictly above the private sector’s compu-
tation.
We conclude that, if eb1 < ∆, then the private sector’s date 0
decisions involve overborrowing and overinvesting.
226 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
Intuitively, the cause of this date 0 overinvestment is that the
private sector undervalues international liquidity in the b-state. At
the aggregate level, resources in the b-state always generate a return
of ∆ from date 1 to date 2. On the other hand, ﬁrms see the cost of
not having date 1 resources as proportional to eb1. As long as e
b
1 < ∆,
the private sector’s investment choices do not lead to maximization
of date 2 expected aggregate consumption.
3.3 The Eﬀect of Anticipated Monetary Policy
The previous result highlights a basic feature of the environment.
Relative to the consumption-maximizing outcome, the private sector
is always biased towards overborrowing and overinvesting. Thus we
have a clear benchmark to evaluate policies that aﬀect the exchange
rate. In particular, the private sector’s biases are exaggerated by a
central bank that attempts to stabilize eb1. More generally, since the
central bank can aﬀect eb1 with its choice of M , it can reduce this
overborrowing problem through monetary policy. A straightforward
argument establishes that if the private sector expects an increase in
M if a crisis takes place at date 1, then k will be reduced at date 0
and expected date 2 consumption will rise.11
4. Dollarization of Liabilities
The credit channel literature in emerging markets has highlighted
the role played by dollarization of domestic liabilities in magnifying
the contraction. Indeed, even in our framework, a depreciated ex-
change rate deteriorates balance sheets by lowering the value of do-
mestic assets relative to liabilities. But our framework qualiﬁes the
main conclusion from the literature: while dollarization may have the
balance-sheet eﬀect highlighted in that literature during mild crises
(horizontal region), it does not during severe crises (vertical region).
At the ﬁrm level, it will seem that the problem is one of dol-
larized liabilities: ﬁrms are credit constrained, and the depreciated
exchange rate will worsen balance sheets. But the relevant constraint
11The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that increasing M causes k to rise.
Then from market clearing at date 1, it must also cause eb1 to rise. However, since
k is a decreasing function of eb1, k must fall. This is a contradiction. Therefore, k
is decreasing in M, and aggregate consumption is increasing in M .
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is a shortage of aggregate international liquidity, not a ﬁrm-level bal-
ance sheet problem. That is, in a vertical crisis, the country faces a
macroeconomic constraint, not a microeconomic one.12
However, for the insurance reasons we discussed in the previous
section, dollarization is not innocuous. It will generally lead to pri-
vate sector underinsurance. Let us discuss these dates 1 and 0 issues
in turn.
4.1 Dollarization During Severe Crises: A Fallacy
of Aggregation
In order to discuss domestic dollarization, we introduce a set of do-
mestic consumers who lend to ﬁrms at date 0. For the purpose of this
subsection, it is suﬃcient to start the analysis at date 1, given some
preexisting debt. Suppose that ﬁrms arrive at the date 1 crisis state
with some dollar-denominated debt, bd, with domestic consumers.
Thus, a distressed ﬁrm’s investment is given as
θk = wn +
ak + M − e1bd
e1
. (11)
The literature emphasizes the fact that from (11) a depreciation
reduces the dollar value of local assets ak and M, while it leaves
unchanged the value of dollarized liabilities e1bd. Moreover, since a
monetary expansion depreciates the exchange rate, it may worsen
balance sheets and, perversely, turn contractionary.
But, as we argue in section 2, this analysis does not consider
that under severe crisis the main binding constraint is the lack of
aggregate international liquidity. Thus, all these considerations of
the eﬀect of M on e1, and hence on the domestic credit squeeze,
are important for distributional issues (from more to less dollarized
ﬁrms and consumers) but not for the aggregate. The exchange rate
reacts to monetary policy precisely to cause a credit squeeze that
equilibrates investment demand with the limited external supply. At
the aggregate level, distressed ﬁrms’ investment is still
θk = 2wn. (12)
12There can be distributional eﬀects—i.e., from those that don’t receive M to
those that do, or from those with more dollarized liabilities to those with fewer
liabilities—but these are likely to be subordinate to the aggregate constraint.
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Replacing (12) into (11) yields a new expression for the exchange
rate as a function of M :
eb,d1 =
ak + M
wn + bd
where the eb,d1 stands for the equilibrium exchange rate with dollar-
ized liabilities. This exchange rate expression needs to be contrasted
with expression eb,p1 when domestic liabilities are denominated in
pesos, bp:
eb,p1 =
ak + M − bp
wn
.
From these two expressions, we can consider the eﬀect of monetary
expansions on the exchange rate in economies with diﬀerent degrees
of dollarization:
0 < eb,d1 (M)
′ =
1
wn + bd
<
1
wn
= eb,p1 (M)
′. (13)
The ﬁrst implication of this expression is that expanding money al-
ways depreciates the exchange rate. A central bank that is concerned
with the balance sheet position of ﬁrms (as in [11]) will be inclined
to contract money and support the exchange rate. But since during
a vertical crisis, the important constraint is that of (12), the central
bank will be protecting the wrong margin.
The second implication of (13) is that during severe crises the
exchange rate in a dollarized economy will be less responsive to a
monetary expansion than that of the nondollarized economy. This
is a sort of market-based fear of ﬂoating, as it results from equi-
librium considerations for a given monetary policy, and not from
any additional caution that the central bank may choose to adopt
when liabilities are dollarized. The reason for this result is precisely
that a depreciation is more contractionary in a dollarized economy
and, therefore, can more easily generate the domestic credit squeeze
needed to reduce investment demand to levels compatible with the
limited availability of international liquidity.
4.2 Underinsurance Eﬀect of Dollarization
There is a more subtle eﬀect of dollarization in our framework. A
central bank at date 1 that is concerned with preserving the balance
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sheets of ﬁrms may, in the vertical region, choose to support the
exchange rate. But boosting eb1 causes ﬁrms to undervalue insuring
against the b-state and set f b higher. This follows from the under-
insurance results of the previous section. In this sense, the negative
eﬀect of central bank support of the exchange rate is that external
liabilities will become less contingent. In a model with richer options
on the denomination of liabilities, this eﬀect will lead to excessive
dollarization of liabilities (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2003).13
That is, while we challenge the standard view that dollarization
of liabilities is a key factor during severe crises, we argue that it is
an important factor behind crises due to the negative eﬀects it has
on private agents’ external insurance decisions.
4.3 Dollarization of External Liabilities
Before concluding this section, we should point out that there is a
related but distinct issue—the dollarization of external liabilities.
This refers to the fact that most emerging market external debt is
not denominated in the issuing country’s currency. If debt is denom-
inated in a country’s own currency, then the debt will be eﬀectively
contingent on aggregate outcomes. In practice, of course, unlike our
theoretical assumptions, there is very little contingent debt issued by
emerging markets. Thus, if developing economies could or would bor-
row abroad in their own currency, they would eﬀectively obtain in-
surance from foreigners against events that depreciate their currency,
such as the tightening of external ﬁnancial constraints. The “original
sin” literature in, e.g., Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2001) high-
lights reluctance on the supply side of that market, while Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2003) describe demand side problems behind
the lack of contingency of external debt. In our current analysis, ex-
ternal dollarization simply means that there is less contingency in
liabilities, so that f b is higher and closer to fg. As a result, the coun-
try will have less international liquidity in the crisis state. It is also
worth noting that the problem of external liability dollarization is
13This implication is supported by Bleakley and Cowan (2002), who ﬁnd that
in economies with ﬁxed exchange rates, the match between the denomination of
liabilities and that of revenues is weaker than in economies with ﬂexible exchange
rates.
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reinforced by the underinsurance eﬀects of dollarization of domestic
liabilities as discussed above.
Adding external liability dollarization to our problem is concep-
tually straightforward and makes the supply of international funds
at date 1 eﬀectively diagonal, but nothing substantive changes in our
analysis. We discuss this extension in section 6.
5. Policy Constraints and Policy Options
In many instances, a central bank faces constraints that force it to
support the exchange rate. Dollarization of domestic liabilities is one
such instance (whether the market or the central bank determines
this is not important for our argument here). Inﬂation credibility
problems are another one. We begin this section with a discussion of
inﬂation credibility, and then turn to alternative policy instruments
when monetary policy is constrained to be procyclical or less counter-
cyclical than desirable. There is an important diﬀerence in the costs
of losing monetary policy during severe crises vis-a`-vis doing so in
mild ones. In the latter, as in the standard Mundell-Fleming context,
the cost is that the central bank loses a countercyclical instrument
to smooth ﬂuctuations. In the former, on the other hand, the cost is
mainly an “insurance” one. The central bank loses a relatively cheap
instrument to induce the private sector to take adequate precautions
against crises. In the standard framework, the natural response to
the loss of monetary policy is to search for another countercyclical
policy instrument (e.g., ﬁscal policy). In the vertical crisis environ-
ment, the natural response is to search for an alternative insurance
mechanism. We discuss such alternatives in the second part of this
section.
5.1 Limited Inﬂation Credibility
Limited inﬂation credibility has two eﬀects in our environment. First,
a central bank with a history of high inﬂation cannot aﬀord the
inﬂationary consequences of an exchange rate depreciation during
a crisis. This is a common explanation for the apparent “fear of
ﬂoating” of central banks in emerging economies (see, e.g., Calvo and
Reinhart 2003). However, for the reasons we have outlined above, the
anticipation of a contractionary monetary policy during a vertical
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crisis will exacerbate the private sector’s underinsurance problem
and thereby worsen the crisis.
A second problem caused by limited inﬂation credibility is that
a central bank that expands monetary policy in a crisis will have a
limited eﬀect on real balances. That is, in our environment, a central
bank does better by increasing real money balances during a crisis.
However, a central bank with limited inﬂation credibility will create
inﬂation with little eﬀect on real money balances and thereby on the
expected return from hoarding international liquidity. In order to
see this, note that in all our derivations up to now we have assumed
there is long-run inﬂation (price level) credibility, so that e2 remains
at one regardless of the monetary policy adopted at date 1. But
suppose that whenever there is a depreciation during a crisis, some
of it is expected to pass through into e2.
To be concrete, suppose that e2 (i.e., the date 2 price level) is
an increasing function of MM , with e2(1) = 1. In a vertical crisis, a
distressed ﬁrm sells M units of money and ak of domestic collateral
to raise funds for salvaging production. The intact ﬁrms lend wn
against these assets. To an intact ﬁrm, the money is worth 1/e2,
proportionately less than the ak of domestic collateral. Thus, let us
deﬁne the return on lending international liquidity as
id1 =
M/e2 + ak
wn
− 1.
The return to an intact ﬁrm of purchasing money with international
liquidity is just e1e2 − 1. Since this return must equal the return to
lending against the domestic collateral of ak, we ﬁnd that the interest
parity condition is:
e1
e2
− 1 = id1.
For the case where e2 = 1, we previously showed that the date 0
level of investment, k, is a decreasing function of e1. We argued that
supporting the currency at date 1 had the consequence of exacerbat-
ing the date 0 overinvestment problem of the private sector. Likewise,
allowing e1 to depreciate through an expansionary monetary policy
reduced the overinvestment problem.
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When e2 is not ﬁxed at one, a similar argument to that of section
3.1 establishes that k is a decreasing function of e1e2 . But since
e1
e2
=
M/e2 + ak
wn
,
the important term for policy purposes is the term involving real
money balances (i.e., M/e2). An expansionary monetary policy raises
real balances only to
M
e2
< M.
Thus, a central bank with limited inﬂation credibility will have to
resort to additional (and possibly very costly) mechanisms to induce
adequate private sector insurance decisions. We turn to this discus-
sion next.
5.2 Insurance Substitutes
The problem created by being unable to raise real balances is that
the social-private spread, ∆−(1+id1), remains high. Thus, the return
to hoarding international liquidity until date 1 remains undervalued,
and private insurance decisions are distorted. As we argued in sec-
tion 3, these considerations are unique to the vertical environment,
because the insurance problem only arises if the aggregate interna-
tional liquidity constraint binds.
There are two obvious ex-ante policy measures that can deal
with the underinsurance problem: taxation of capital inﬂows during
normal times (date 0) and international liquidity requirements at
date 0. We now characterize the relationship between an ex-ante tax
and id1.
The ﬁrst order condition in AGG is
c′(kAGG)(1 + i∗0)∆ = (1− π)A + π
1
2
(A + a) ,
whereas for the private sector the condition sets (9) equal to (10)
(with e1 replaced by 1 + id1).
Aligning the date 0 private and consumption-maximizing incen-
tives is a matter of choosing a tax/transfer policy. Suppose that the
central bank levies a tax τ per unit of k, which is returned to ﬁrms
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in a lump sum fashion. Then the ﬁrst order condition for the private
sector becomes
c′(k)(1 + i∗0)
∆ + 1 + id1
2
= (1− π)A + π1
2
(
A + a
∆
1 + id1
)
− τ .
Choosing τ to align the private and central-bank incentives yields
that for any equilibrium level of id1,τ , the optimal tax solves
τ(id1,τ ) =
1
2
(
aπ
1 + id1,τ
+ c′(kAGG)(1 + i∗0)
)
(∆− (1 + id1,τ )).
The tax is increasing in ∆ − (1 + id1,τ ). Thus, economies where
the central bank cannot follow countercyclical monetary policy, and
therefore ∆ − (1 + id1) remains high, may need to rely on capital
controls to correct the underinsurance problem. Note that the same
result could be achieved via a contingent liquidity requirement. The
tax solution gives the private sector incentives to choose the eﬃcient
k, thus resulting in the eﬃcient w − f b. Alternatively, the central
bank could mandate directly that each ﬁrm preserve international
liquidity for the date 1 crisis state, so that the eﬃcient level of w−f b
is realized.
In practice, taxes come with their own sets of distortions: dead-
weight costs of taxation, costs of enforcement, evasion, etc. However,
the important point to recognize is that, in the vertical environment,
the cost of losing monetary policy is not being unable to manage
aggregate demand or the extent of the domestic credit squeeze at
date 1. Rather, the cost is the underinsurance by the private sector
at date 0. In this sense, the cost of having to enforce capital controls
may be seen as a direct cost of losing monetary policy.
6. Robustness: Peso Rates and Diagonal Supply
In this section, we show that our main conclusions are robust to
modiﬁcations in two of the most stylized features of our model: the
absence of a monetary friction and the absolute price inelasticity of
the supply of funds during crises.
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6.1 Peso Rates and Interest Parity Condition
Up to now we have simpliﬁed our analysis by removing all monetary
frictions from the analysis, and therefore have set the domestic peso
interest rate to zero. This simpliﬁes exchange rate determination
at date 1, but leaves us with an unusual model of money. Here we
sketch a more standard model of money, in which money is special
because it provides a transaction service.14 Our substantive results
remain unchanged, although now we recover the standard exchange
rate eﬀect via the interest parity condition in addition to the excess
sensitivity result we discussed in the previous sections.
Let us return to the full inﬂation credibility case (e2 = 1) and let
us focus on the vertical region and the bad aggregate state.
At the end of date 1, the government has liabilities of B bonds
and M units of money per capita. Each bond is redeemed at date
2 for one unit of money, and the government is credible in ensur-
ing that the price level at date 2 is one. At date 1, money is the
only domestically liquid asset. Neither claims against ak (corporate
bonds) nor the government bonds are liquid. Thus, at date 1, dis-
tressed ﬁrms sell M units of money to the intact ﬁrms in exchange
for wn units of international liquidity, which means that
eb1 =
M
wn
.
It is instructive to go through the steps that take us to this equation
in order to disentangle the mechanisms through which money aﬀects
the exchange rate during severe crises in this economy.
We introduce a date 1− in order to study peso interest rates and
the eﬀects of open market operations. At date 1− the aggregate state
of the world has been realized, but the identity of agents receiving
the shock (distressed or intact) has not. Because of the latter, agents
are all identical at 1−.
At date 1−, both the bond market and the money market are
open to all agents. Entering date 1−, the government has outstand-
ing B bonds and M money. The government does an open market
operation to purchase (B −B) bonds for (M −M) money.
Let us consider the relative asset returns on bonds, money, and
international liquidity at date 1−.
14See Diamond and Rajan (2001, 2003) and Lorenzoni (2001) for alternative
models of money in liquidity-based frameworks.
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One bond yields one unit of money at date 2 and costs 1/(1+ ip1)
units of money at date 1−, where ip1 is the peso interest rate. One
unit of money can be sold at date 1 to ﬁnance the liquidity shock if
the agent is distressed. Money is sold for international liquidity at a
price of 1/e1− . Each unit of international liquidity yields ∆ at date
2. Thus the expected return on holding money from date 1− to date
2 is 0.5 (∆/e1− + 1). As before, ∆ ≥ e1− , which means that the net
return is positive. It immediately follows that indiﬀerence between
holding money and bonds requires that
1 + ip1 =
1
2
(
∆
e1−
+ 1
)
. (14)
One unit of money also can be converted in the foreign exchange
market into one unit of international liquidity, at the price of e1− .
One unit of international liquidity either can be used in production
at date 1 or sold to a distressed ﬁrm at date 1. The expected beneﬁt
of the unit of international liquidity is 12(∆+e1−). Thus, the interest
parity condition is
(1 + ip1)e1− =
1
2
(∆ + e1−). (15)
In the standard interest parity condition, the right-hand side of (15)
is ﬁxed, and a reduction in ip1 must be oﬀset by a depreciation in e1−
to keep the left-hand side constant as well. But the depreciation in
our vertical environment raises the return to the dollar-lender in the
right-hand side of (15), which means that the left-hand side must
rise, and this is achieved by a further depreciation in e1− . The latter
is the excess sensitivity result we have discussed, and it results from
the relaxation of the domestic credit squeeze caused by the monetary
expansion.
Finally, combining (14) and (15), we can solve for the peso inter-
est rate and the exchange rate as a function of monetary policy:
1 + ip1 =
1
2
(
∆
M
wn + 1
)
e1− =
M
wn
.
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The latter is the expression we started this section with, and it sum-
marizes the two channels through which money aﬀects the exchange
rate: interest parity and domestic credit squeeze.
Relative to our earlier model, it is the former (and standard)
channel that is new. But neither channel can change the fact that
international liquidity is ﬁxed at date 1 and hence output cannot be
aﬀected by monetary policy:
CV =
(
A + a
2
)
k + wn∆+ yc.
And for date 0 decisions, it is only the second channel that matters,
which is common to this and the model without monetary frictions.
6.2 “Diagonal” Supply
Let us now return to the model without monetary frictions, and
continue to assume e2 = 1. But rather than an inelastic supply of
funds at date 1, let us consider instead a supply curve of the form
wns(e1) where s(1) = 1, s′(·) > 0.
That is, the supply of international funds is “diagonal” as opposed
to vertical.15
Equilibrium at date 1 is now
ak + M
1 + id1
= wns(e1).
As in the pure vertical model, e1 is increasing in M . However, con-
sider the expression for total consumption at date 2. This is
CV =
(
A + a
2
)
k + wns(e1)∆ + yc,
15The diagonal supply also captures the idea that depreciating the exchange
rate increases exports and, if the export sector is an important part of interna-
tional collateral, thereby expands supply. Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004)
oﬀer a related perspective on diagonal supply. In their model, imperfect liquidity
substitution stems from imperfect input-substitution and from the fact that dif-
ferent inputs are paid in diﬀerent currencies. The “diagonal” aspect of their model
arises from the (limited) possibility of substituting tradables and nontradables
inputs.
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which is now an increasing function of e1 through the s(·) function.
This implies that increasing M does have a contemporaneous eﬀect
on CV .
Thus, from a date 1 perspective, the diagonal model has elements
of both the horizontal model and the vertical model. As in the hor-
izontal model, there is an aggregate demand channel/credit squeeze
channel through which expanding money increases aggregate con-
sumption. As in the vertical model, the money expansion depreciates
the exchange rate beyond the standard interest parity eﬀect.
Now, let us shift back to date 0. At this date, the ﬁrm contem-
plates borrowing some resources and increasing k, the size of the
plant. As before, the shadow cost of the resources is increasing in e1.
A higher expected e1 induces a ﬁrm to save some dollar resources
until date 1, at which point these resources can always be lent to
return e1 − 1. Moreover, as long as e1 < ∆, the private sector’s de-
cisions will not be consumption maximizing. Thus, as in the vertical
model, there is an insurance channel for monetary policy in the diag-
onal model. Expanding M at date 1 depreciates e1. The anticipation
of such depreciation makes the private sector reduce investment at
date 0 and increase its insurance against the date 1 shock.
7. Final Remarks
The past decade has witnessed several episodes in which the sud-
den reversals of capital inﬂows triggers an emerging markets’ crisis.
These events have placed the risk of “sudden stops” as a central
macroeconomic concern for emerging market economies. The main
contribution of our paper is to illustrate how monetary policy af-
fects ﬁnancial constraints of ﬁrms during a sudden stop crisis and
to highlight an insurance eﬀect of monetary policy. Domestic mone-
tary expansion relaxes individual ﬁnancial constraints but is unable
to relax the aggregate ﬁnancial constraint faced by these economies
during crises—it is the wrong kind of liquidity for such a purpose.
However, while monetary policy is largely futile once the sudden
stop has taken place, the anticipation of a particular reaction by the
authority is important for private sector insurance decisions. A ﬂex-
ible exchange rate system, coupled with a countercyclical monetary
policy, provides better insurance incentives to the private sector than
a policy of defending the exchange rate during sudden stops.
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Our insurance mechanism is distinct (or in addition to) the stan-
dard moral-hazard/free-insurance argument (see, e.g., Dooley 1999).
In the latter argument, crises result from an implicit commitment
by a local government or foreign institution to transfer resources
to the imprudent borrower; a ﬁxed exchange rate transfers reserves
at submarket value (during crises) to the dollar-borrower or peso-
investor. In our model, there is no direct transfer from the govern-
ment. The monetary contraction implicit in the defense of the ex-
change rate lowers the domestic liquidity that borrowers can oﬀer to
dollar-lenders during the sudden stop, and in so doing, it lowers the
eﬀective return from new local dollar lending. By doing so, it aﬀects
the incentives to hoard international liquidity for crises.
More generally, monetary policy and its constraints have (un-
intended) consequences for the private sector’s insurance decisions
with respect to sudden stops. Policies that exacerbate the domes-
tic credit squeeze during sudden stops, or constraints that limit the
authorities’ ability to relax domestic ﬁnancial constraints, lead to
socially imprudent private sector actions.
Our emphasis on dual liquidity and insurance has relevance for
evaluation of other government policies. Proactively managing in-
ternational reserves may result in beneﬁts in our framework (see
Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004). Since international reserves are
a form of international liquidity, and the private sector carries too
little international liquidity into crises, the central bank has a role
to play by carrying reserves in place of the private sector. Injecting
reserves during a crisis relaxes the international ﬁnancial constraint
faced by the private sector and stabilizes the exchange rate. Relax-
ing the constraint is beneﬁcial, but the eﬀect on the private sector’s
own insurance incentives is not, for reasons akin to those we dis-
cussed in the context of monetary policy. Reserves management and
monetary policy become complementary policy tools in this con-
text. At the very least, the central bank ought to sterilize the forex
intervention and possibly go beyond that in the monetary expan-
sion in order to oﬀset the perverse incentive eﬀect of the reserves
injection.
Of course, the insurance dimension we highlight in our anal-
ysis is not a substitute for conventional inﬂation credibility con-
cerns. Quite the contrary, without inﬂation credibility, the central
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bank will be unable to let the exchange rate ﬂoat and expand
monetary policy during sudden stops, and may well be forced into
tightening monetary policy. The anticipation of this behavior is
very costly in our setting, precisely because it exacerbates the pri-
vate sector’s underinsurance problem. In other words, our insurance
consideration raises the value of achieving medium-term inﬂation
credibility.
Our stylized model is subject to many caveats. One worth men-
tioning in concluding is the lack of true dynamics. In reality, crises
build up, going ﬁrst through a horizontal phase in which domestic
ﬁnancial conditions tighten and external borrowing becomes gradu-
ally more expensive, then falling into a sharp vertical sudden-stop
phase. A central question for policymakers in this context is how
to conduct monetary policy at the early stages of the crisis, when
supply is still horizontal but there is a concern that events may lead
to a binding international liquidity constraint. At this stage, tight-
ening monetary policy will destroy ﬁnancially constrained projects
but save international liquidity for the vertical event. We conjecture
that this trade-oﬀ can be analyzed in terms similar to those we have
used throughout: if the commitment to an aggressive countercyclical
monetary policy in case of a vertical event is credible, then there is
little need to tighten during the horizontal phase. But if the com-
mitment is not credible or feasible, then the appropriate response is
to tighten during the early phase in order to protect international
liquidity, very much as taxing capital ﬂows at date 0 was advisable in
our simpliﬁed model when there were constraints on monetary policy
during crises. In fact, the costs in terms of the additional ﬁnancial
distress imposed on the domestic private sector are, to a large ex-
tent, comparable to the costs of the ex-ante measures we already
discussed.
Finally, while our analysis has focused on emerging markets, the
underlying structure may be a starting point for other applications.
Our model illustrates how a bottleneck may segment ﬁnancial mar-
kets and create liquidity premia on assets. It shows how monetary
policy aﬀects and is aﬀected by these bottlenecks. There are many
other scenarios, such as liquidity traps and post-bubble-collapses,
where similar ingredients appear worthy of consideration. We are
currently exploring these applications.
240 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
Appendix
Financing Assumptions
The ﬁnancial frictions of the model are embodied in the following
two assumptions:
Assumption 1 (International Collateral)
Foreigners lend to domestic ﬁrms only against the backing of w. Do-
mestic agents lend against w, M , and ak.
Assumption 2 (Domestic Collateral)
A domestic lender can only be sure that a ﬁrm will produce ak units of
goods at date 2. Any excess production based on physical reinvestment
at date 1 is neither observable nor veriﬁable.
One last assumption is required to rule out date 0 insurance
arrangements that transfer resources from distressed ﬁrms to intact
ﬁrms.
Assumption 3 (Nonobservability of Production Shock)
The production shock at date 1 is idiosyncratic. The identity of ﬁrms
receiving the shock is private information.
The mechanism design problem associated with these ﬁnancing
and informational constraints corresponds to the one inAGG. There
is also a banking arrangement that, in principle, may get around the
private information constraint, but this is very fragile.
Technical Assumptions
Consider next the technical assumptions on parameters that we have
used. The program in AGG is
AGG:
maxk,fg ,fb (1− π)(Ak + w − fg) + π
(
w − f b
1 + i∗1
∆+
A + a
2
k
)
s.t. fg, f b ≤ w
c(k) ≤ 1
(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
(πf b + (1− π)fg).
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First, we require that w = fg in this program, or that the return
to investing domestically exceeds that of investing abroad.
Assumption 4 (High Investment Return)
(1− π)A + πA + a
2
≥ c′
(
w
(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
)
(1 + i∗0)(1 + i
∗
1).
Second, we require that the solution features some insurance against
the b-state, so that f b < w.
Assumption 5 (High Return to Insuring)
c′
(
w
(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
)
(1 + i∗0)∆ ≥ (1− π)A + π
A + a
2
.
These last two assumptions can both be met by choosing a large
enough value for ∆.
We require that equilibrium, with no central bank intervention,
places us in the vertical region, or
1 + i∗1 < e1 < ∆.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the program in PRIV is
c′(k)(1 + i∗0)
∆ + e1
2
= (1− π)A + π1
2
(
A + a
∆
e1
)
.
Denote the solution to this equation as k(e1). Then the largest value
of k is attained when e1 = 1+i∗1, and the smallest value when e1 = ∆.
Using this knowledge as well as the market clearing condition leads
to:
Assumption 6 (Equilibrium in Vertical Region)
π(M + ak(i∗1))
w − (1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)c(k(i∗1))
<
∆
1 + i1∗
π(Mak(∆− 1))
w − (1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)c(k(∆− 1))
> 1
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Finally, we have implicitly assumed that the maximum reinvest-
ment constraint does not bind in the vertical equilibrium:
k
2
>
w − f b
1 + i∗1
=
w − c(k)(1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)
π(1 + i∗1)
This can be rewritten as
e1 =
π(M + ak)
w − (1 + i∗0)(1 + i∗1)c(k)
> 2a.
This leads to:
Assumption 7 (Reinvestment Constraint Does Not Bind
in V )
a <
1 + i∗1
2
Dollarization of Domestic Liabilities
We sketch an extension to the model of section 6 in order to address
dollarization of liabilities. As mentioned in section 5.2, this is one of
the primary reasons that policymakers give for being unable to lower
interest rates during a crisis.
Suppose that ﬁrms have debts of D dollars that have to be settled
at date 1−. These debts are owed to domestic consumers, so that they
do not aﬀect the international liquidity of the country. Then the
total peso net worth of agents at date 1−, before any open market
operations, is
NW =
B
1 + ip1
+ M +
ak
1 + ip1
−De1− (A1)
Now suppose that the government does an open market opera-
tion where it purchases bonds with money. Since this transaction is
done at market prices, the net worth remains as in (A1).
The open market operation has two eﬀects. First, it lowers ip1 and
thereby raises ak
1+ip1
. Second, it raises e1− and thereby increases the
debt burden of domestic ﬁrms. For a large enough value of D, it is
clear that the second eﬀect can overwhelm the ﬁrst, so that peso net
worth falls rather than rises with the open market operation.
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The interesting case for our model is when, after the open market
operation, NW < M . That is, the peso net worth of the ﬁrms is less
than the aggregate amount of money in the domestic economy. In this
case, ﬁrms will not be able to sell their assets at date 1− to acquire
all of M . Thus, the market clearing condition at date 1 becomes
1 + id1 =
NW
wn
.
In this case, expansionary open market operations lower id1 rather
than raise it, but still have no eﬀect on output. At date 1, since ex-
pansionary open market operations depreciate the exchange rate,
the central bank will raise interest rates. The reaction in this case
is ex-ante optimal, since raising interest rates causes id1 to rise and
leads to better insurance decisions by the private sector. However,
the fact that the central bank’s time inconsistency problem is atten-
uated when domestic liabilities are dollarized does not mean that the
underinsurance problem has been resolved. Quite the contrary, time
inconsistency has been reduced because the country has no access
to monetary policy.
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